NateOZ

I'm a proud speculator then - because I sure hope I can sell my RS for more than what I bought it for when the time comes, no matter when that is.

lumber

Again, the only people upset about rs prices are those not getting one.
Ive lost money on every car ive owned, even a ford gt.

This might be a car that actually holds/increases in value?
Great, its about time...

sccchiii

Interesting....whats changing?

Petevb

We can all hope... Question is, is that why you're buying the car?

NateOZ

Not really but it plays into part of it - I had narrowed it down to the GT3 RS vs a 675LT, went with the RS because of better resale prospects. This was before either was announced as I had to make a deposit early for the 675.

Having seen both now I think I made the right choice.

Petevb

I think resale and cost to own plays a part in all of our decisions. However... If you knew you wouldn't make any money on it, would you still buy the car?

mrsullivan

not tracking with you... say again/differently?

I have been on waitlists, conversations, etc. on the RS from when it first came out.

I only finally just broke through, on 2 allocations, one at MSRP and one at a small premium (because PTS).

Not sure what any of that had to do with my comments. Whatever the premium is that the market will pay/bear, either the dealer, broker, or consumer... someone has to get that money, because Porsche underpriced or undersupplied the car. If dealers want to hold to MSRP when they sell it new, it means they want to try to make that up on trades/reselling, etc.

NateOZ

The cars available now are most likely with dealers that have been speculating on the market and are looking for an extra profit - hence the allocations are still sitting. It's not an accurate distribution of the market - I know of 15 cars at MSRP and no conditions from dealers near me that are all sold. But if you call Manhattan/Princeton/Huntington it's $100k+ over and they have cars available.

dark knight

and those dealers should be punished by PCNA

snabbgt3

Why? ... for listing the GT3RS with an asking price that the market may support ... this is the United States of America, the land of free enterprise!

To change this status quo either PAG has to make more halo cars (which they won't as they don't want these cars to languish on showroom floors or dealer's lots) or the demand for these cars has to lessen (doubtful with these well-engineered cars).

Why would PCNA ever "punish" dealers for testing the waters and trying to make a profit?

ipse dixit

Exactly.

It's a terrible slippery slope one makes when one advocates having PCNA (or more precisely, PAG) horse-collar U.S. dealers for pricing a vehicle with a market premium.

Because you know what? If that line of reasoning holds true, then the converse would also necessarily apply.

Next time a dealer decides to advertise an on-the-lot car with $XXXX discount, or offers to give "you" (the buyer) some percent off MSRP, then by the logic noted above PAG should be able horse-collar the dealer because they're devaluing the marque -- i.e., any dealer selling a car below MSRP is cheapening the brand.

Careful what one asks for. Things work both ways.

orthojoe

I for one would be totally ok with fixed prices on cars. The slight of hand and back room shenanigans that go on with dealers is the main reason everyone hates car dealers. Make it a fixed price, same for everyone, no games, and no dealers. Everyone will be much happier with their car buying experience in the end.

Z356

As Yogi (may he rest in peace) used to say: "It's like déjà vu all over again."
Porsche has tried to set up 'innovative selling models' in the US in the past...
without much success as yet. I remember well one particular 'fight' with their
US dealers in the early 1980's. And I think it's worth recounting that tale to
all of you here at Rennlist:





Automotive News Special Issue: The Franchise System -- 9/25/06
Karl Ludvigsen
Automotive News
September 25, 2006 - 12:01 am ET
A generation ago, Porsche tried to replace its U.S. dealerships with a new distribution network. To the company's surprise, the dealers' legal muscle prevailed.
Porsche's U.S. sales were rising and its profits were booming in the early 1980s. The company wanted more direct control of its place in the U.S. luxury market.

In January 1984, the 323 U.S. dealers who sold Porsche cars learned that the company would not renew its contract with Volkswagen of America Inc., which had imported Porsches since 1969. As of September, the dealers were told, they no longer would get Porsches from VW.

The other shoe dropped Feb. 15, when Porsche executives met in Reno, Nev., with the automaker's dealers. Porsche said it had set up a new company, Porsche Cars North America Inc. It would be headed by a former U.S. head of BMW, Jack Cook.

A subsidiary of the new company, Porsche Centers Inc., would set up 40 stores across the United States to sell vehicles at retail and also distribute them to dealers, said Porsche AG CEO Peter Schutz.

"Each will be from a cookie cutter," Schutz told the startled dealers, "with a standard building of about 22,000 square feet on around two acres of land. Each will be in an industrial park near a major airport." All of the centers were to be up and running by the beginning of 1985, he said.

Porsche would spend about $25 million to build the centers, Schutz said. In addition, Schutz and Cook hoped to attract investment in the centers by existing dealers and wealthy Porsche owners.

Going it alone

At Porsche headquarters in Stuttgart, the company's new sales chief, Mario Jon Nedelcu, explained the reasoning behind the plan. Now that VW was building cars in the United States, he said, "the quality of the marketing organization could no longer develop in sufficient measure to suit our exclusive automobiles."

Schutz also was concerned about some U.S. dealers charging other dealers a hefty premium for hot Porsche models, thus inflating prices to customers. Porsche also would need a strong and efficient U.S. distribution network, Schutz knew, to fend off growing competition from Japan.

Consultants assured Schutz that Porsche was within its legal rights in planning its new network. "Since we were establishing a completely new marketing apparatus," Nedelcu said, "we had no contracts and no obligations. In this situation we could establish our business as we felt it should be, and in a form which suited the product."

Agents, not dealers

Porsche assured its dealers that they weren't out in the cold. They could continue to service the cars.

Acting as sales agents, they also could take orders for cars that the nearest Porsche Center would fill. But instead of maintaining their 16.7 percent dealer discount, they would have to accept 8 percent as agents.

Porsche gave the dealers 60 days to decide whether they wanted to be part of the new arrangement.

Dealer groups immediately attacked the plan. The National Automobile Dealers Association said it "strikes to the heart of the franchise system." NADA vowed to "take whatever actions necessary to preserve the legitimate interest of our Porsche dealers."

The American International Automobile Dealers Association said the scheme was "a frontal assault on the entire automotive franchise system and must be resisted by all automobile dealers. If Porsche can get away with this, every carmaker will try it."

U.S. Porsche dealers had invested as much as $300 million in their stores, AIADA said. Porsche's plan, it argued, would "render much of this investment valueless and inflict grievous damage on these dealers."

Taking it all away

Dealers ridiculed the notion of investment partnerships in the Porsche Centers. Said Joe Herman, a Porsche dealer in Rochester, N.Y.: "It was like being told, 'We are taking your wife away, but since we know you are still interested, you can buy a piece of the bedroom set and once in a while you can come and pay a visit.' "

Alan Johnson sold 200 Porsches a year at his San Diego dealership, and he raced Porsches as well. "I've developed an asset that I value very highly," he said. "Now somebody's taking that away from me."

Volkswagen of America also objected to the Porsche proposal. Fortune magazine estimated that VW made more than $40 million importing Porsches in 1983.

VW found itself the target of lawsuits by its independent distributors, which said the suspension of Porsche deliveries would violate state franchise laws. To protect itself, VW filed protests against Porsche with motor vehicle boards in several states.

Most states had laws that governed dealer termination and retail activity. Some prohibited automakers from selling cars directly at factory stores, a common practice in Europe. Despite the promise of lining up independent investors, the Porsche Centers smelled suspiciously like factory stores to many skeptics.

The dealers pledged to stick together. Just days after the Reno meeting, dealers contributed more than $1 million to a fund to fight the Porsche Centers plan. A new Porsche Dealers Action Committee hired law firms in Washington, D.C., and California to prepare federal suits.

Dealers filed lawsuits against Porsche and VW that sought more than $3 billion in damages and penalties. They also lodged 69 administrative protests with state motor vehicle authorities.

In March, Porsche gave in. Cook told dealers that the company was abandoning the Porsche Centers plan. Instead, he said, Porsche Cars North America would work directly with the traditional dealerships. It would negotiate a new franchise agreement with the Porsche Dealers Action Committee.

Following Europe's model

How did Porsche misjudge so badly? From a European vantage point, factory stores were the norm rather than a threat. Automakers in Europe could control their dealers much more rigorously, because their franchise agreements were exempted from European Community laws governing business competition.

Automotive News editorialized that Porsche had made "one of the biggest retreats in the history of the auto industry. … We fear that Porsche has damaged its relationship with its dealers and that it may take a long time for the wounds to heal."

Fortune said Schutz's "repeated defense of the plan before the family owners turned him into an advocate rather than an analyst ... Lacking confidence in his German executives, Schutz grew increasingly isolated as he concentrated on the specifics of his scheme."

In defeat, Schutz said that "in the time available, we couldn't wrestle all the alligators. You can't take on the whole world."

Cook's tour

Cook had told his colleagues he was convinced the Porsche Centers project would succeed. He said later he was astonished by the uproar the plan created. "We obviously not only struck a nerve, but we struck a chord much deeper in the whole retail automotive dealer organization," he said.

A former BMW dealer, Cook took responsibility for the "agent" tag that had alienated many dealers. "That one is my fault," he said. "I wanted to differentiate between dealerships and the new entity."

Porsche's U.S. sales windfall proved transient. As the German mark rose against the dollar later in the 1980s, prices rose and sales fell.

In 1988, Cook left Porsche Cars North America. A spokesperson said, "Porsche has different plans and measures to promote sales in the United States."

Karl Ludvigsen is the author of Porsche - Excellence Was Expected, published by Robert Bentley Inc. The book is available at www.bentleypublishers.com.


***

http://www.autonews.com/article/2006...rs:-no-contest

Saludos,
Eduardo
Carmel

orthojoe

Thanks, Eduardo. I do remember reading about this before. Although I don't like the cars, I love telsa's sales model and NADA hates Tesla. I can't blame nada, because they know people hate dealers and they would be out of business in a flash with direct sales. They (nada)are fighting for their lives, but not for the consumer. That is for sure. It would be awesome if Porsche tried to do it again, but we all know that it will never happen because Nada has deep enough pockets to influence the law....

hfm

Fascinating story Eduardo. Effectively, a dealership collective bargaining agreement stopped Porsche. A collective of educated customers could do the same to a dealership.

It happens here to a certain extent. For example, Sonnen in Northern California has generated good will for selling at MSRP and Auto Gallery in Southern California has generated the opposite for marking up $20k to $100k+. But, AG still exists because, not everyone who buys a Porsche visits Rennlist. On the other hand, everyone who visits Rennlist will look to Sonnen for a purchase. As a consumer, recognizing the benefit of a free market, we also recognize the importance of patronizing and sending money and business to the Sonnens of the world and, not the AGs.

Dan (expects and has received fair treatment from his dealership)